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Police as Community Caretakers: 
Caniglia v. Strom
Christopher Slobogin*
What is the proper role of the police? That question has been at 
the forefront of debates about policing for quite some time, but es-
pecially in the past year. One answer, spurred by countless news 
stories about black people killed by law enforcement officers, is that 
the power of the police should be reduced to the bare minimum, 
with some in the Defund the Police movement calling for outright 
abolition of local police departments.1 Toward the other end of the 
spectrum is the notion that the role of the police in modern soci-
ety is and must be capacious. Police should function as “community 
caretakers,” because “a police officer—over and above his weighty 
responsibilities for enforcing the criminal law—must act as a master 
of all emergencies, who is ‘expected to aid those in distress, combat 
actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and 
provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect com-
munity safety.’”2
That commodious language comes from the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the case of Caniglia v. Strom.3 The court relied on the “spe-
cial role of the police in our society” to hold that police may enter the 
home of a suicidal individual to seize his guns, when he is not pres-
ent, in the absence of consent, and without a warrant.4 As a matter 
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1 See Asha Ransby Sporn, “Campaigns to Defund Police Have Seen Major Wins—and 
They’re Not Stopping,” Truthout, May 25, 2021, https://bit.ly/3j7DAx2 (describing 
Defund movement and quoting one leader stating that “[i]t would be a failure to . . . try 
to gently bend policing to make it friendlier. We are proposing something that has not 
been done yet, which is to dismantle the policing and prison systems.”).
2 Caniglia v. Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 124 (1st Cir. 2020).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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of formal legal doctrine, the First Circuit purported to be applying 
what courts have long called the “community caretaker exception” 
to the Fourth Amendment rule that warrants are usually required to 
carry out a search of a home and the seizure of items in it.
The First Circuit’s holding did not stand for long, however. In 
an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, a unanimous Su-
preme Court (not a common phenomenon these days) reversed the 
First Circuit, taking only four pages to do so (also unusual in re-
cent years).5 While recognizing that one of its earlier cases, Cady v. 
Dombrowski,6 had alluded to a community caretaker exception to the 
warrant requirement when police are engaged in something other 
than crime-fighting, Justice Thomas noted that Cady had involved a 
warrantless search of a disabled car and had “repeatedly stressed” 
that there is “a constitutional difference” between houses and cars.7 
Rebuking the First Circuit for extrapolating from Cady “a freestand-
ing community-caretaking exception that applies to both cars and 
homes,” the Court admonished, “What is reasonable for vehicles is 
different from what is reasonable for homes.”8 It concluded that Ed-
ward Caniglia’s lawsuit for damages against the city of Cranston, 
Rhode Island, and its police department was viable.
There were three concurring opinions, each agreeing with the re-
sult but carefully laying out what the majority opinion did not pro-
hibit. Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, 
provided a reminder that earlier decisions had allowed warrant-
less home entries to prevent violence, restore order, and render 
first aid.9 Similarly, Justice Samuel Alito suggested that the Fourth 
Amendment would not be violated by warrantless entries of resi-
dences when an occupant presents an imminent risk of suicide or 
is otherwise in “urgent need of medical attention and cannot sum-
mon help.”10 Finally, Justice Brett Kavanaugh reviewed the cases in 
which the Court had allowed warrantless entries to fight a fire and 
investigate its cause, to prevent imminent destruction of evidence, to 
5 Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021).
6 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
7 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1599 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 439).
8 Id. at 1600.
9 Id. at 1600 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
10 Id. at 1601 (Alito, J., concurring).
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engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, and to handle a number of 
other “exigent circumstances.”11
The seizure of guns in Caniglia fit none of these scenarios be-
cause it was not necessary to prevent imminent harm to anyone 
or to respond to some other emergency. The day before the seizure 
Edward Caniglia had placed a handgun on his dining room table 
and asked his wife to “shoot me and get it over with.” Rather than 
obliging, his wife left the home and spent the night at a hotel. The 
next morning, when she was unable to reach her husband by phone, 
she called the police and accompanied them to the house, where 
Edward was sitting on the porch. After some dialogue, the police 
convinced Edward to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation 
and arranged for an ambulance to take him there. Only then, after 
Edward was gone, did the police go in to get the guns.
So the Caniglia opinion, on its face, is a narrow one: police cannot 
go into a home without a warrant in the absence of some type of 
extenuating circumstance. But the case still provides a springboard 
for raising a number of issues about the proper role of the police. 
The first is why the police were involved in this case at all. Edward 
Caniglia was not committing a crime, nor was he about to do so. His 
wife said she did not fear for her life, only for Edward’s. If something 
needed to be done about the situation, wouldn’t a team of mental 
health professionals have been a better fit? This is the type of ques-
tion that many in the Defund the Police movement are asking.
A second set of issues, pertinent even when the police are the only 
option, is raised by the Court’s firm conclusion in Caniglia that police 
cannot excuse the failure to obtain a warrant with the mere fact that 
they are engaging in “tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement,” 
to use Justice Alito’s phrase.12 Justice Thomas’s opinion seemed to re-
ject the idea of a “freestanding” caretaker exception in connection 
with home entries,13 and Justice Alito interpreted the Court’s opinion 
to reject it in any setting.14 At the same time, the various opinions in 
11 Id. at 1604–05 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 1600 (Alito, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 1598 (noting that “the First Circuit extrapolated a freestanding community-
caretaking exception that applies to both cars and homes” and holding that the excep-
tion did not apply to homes).
14 Id. (“The Court’s decision in [Cady] did not recognize any such ‘freestanding’ 
Fourth Amendment category.”).
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Caniglia, including Alito’s, appear to contemplate that at least some 
tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement do permit warrant-
less entry even when there is time to get a warrant. So the question is 
raised, what are police allowed to do in the name of “caretaking”? The 
suggestion made here is that, given the potential for police misuse of 
force and for pretextual actions by the police, warrantless home en-
tries in the absence of real exigency should never be part of policing’s 
mission, even when a “caretaking” goal can be articulated.
Then there is the possibility, admittedly speculative, that Cani-
glia could also affect searches and seizures outside the home. First, if 
there is no such thing as a freestanding caretaker exception, then Cady 
itself—involving a nonexigent warrantless search of a vehicle—might 
be questioned, or at least framed more accurately. Caniglia could also 
lead to a rethinking of what the courts call “special needs” doctrine. 
This doctrine—like the community caretaking exception—relaxes the 
usual Fourth Amendment strictures when a search or seizure purports 
to be facilitative rather than aimed at “ordinary crime control.”15 Under 
the special-needs rubric, the Supreme Court has permitted searches of 
school children and public employees for disciplinary infractions not 
only in the absence of a warrant but also on something less than prob-
able cause. It has also sanctioned warrantless and suspicionless searches 
and seizures in connection with government inspections for dangerous 
conditions, checkpoints set up for various regulatory purposes, and 
drug testing programs aimed at safety rather than prosecution. While 
the Court has offered various rationales for these decisions, Caniglia’s 
concern about an overly expansive community caretaking exception 
resonates with similar criticisms aimed at the elastic nature of its spe-
cial needs cases. Perhaps some finetuning is necessary here as well.
I. Who Are the Best “Caretakers”?
Police are heavily involved in dealing with people who have 
a mental illness. From 10 to 20 percent of 911 calls involve mental 
health crises.16 In many communities, the response to those calls is 
15 See infra Part III; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
16 The 20 percent figure comes from Eugene, Oregon; see infra text following note 28. 
A nationwide estimate is that 10 percent of 911 calls require some sort of mental health 
intervention. Mike Maciag, “The Daily Crisis Cops Aren’t Trained to Handle,” Govern-
ing.com, Apr. 27, 2016, https://bit.ly/2Sno8Sm.
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to send the police; in fact, even when the 911 caller is a concerned 
family member, he or she often asks for the police, as Caniglia’s wife 
in fact did.
But that is probably the wrong move most of the time. Nearly a 
quarter of all people killed by the police in the past five years have 
been people with mental illness.17 That statistic raises an obvious 
question. Why are people who are trained to use deadly force, and 
have the means to use it, the primary response to a suicide threat or 
to a person who is beyond the control of family members? Presum-
ably the goal in these cases is to talk the person down, not shoot 
them or otherwise harm them. Yet the latter is often what happens. 
Two recent cases are illustrative. The first ended with police shooting 
a 13-year-old boy with an autism-related disorder whose mother had 
called because he was having a “mental breakdown.”18 The second 
involved Daniel Prude, a 43-year-old black man who was wandering 
in the streets naked and babbling. Police put a hood over his head (to 
prevent him from spitting on them), pressed him to the ground a la 
Chauvin, and killed him.19
Even when a person with mental illness has a weapon (neither 
the 13-year-old nor Prude did), bringing in the police is probably a 
bad idea. For instance, in Kisela v. Hughes,20 someone called the po-
lice to report a woman hacking at a tree with a kitchen knife. Three 
officers responded and were met by the caller, who told them the 
woman had been behaving erratically and then had disappeared. 
Soon afterward, the police saw Hughes, who fit the caller’s de-
scription, emerge from a house carrying a large knife and walk 
within six feet of another woman, who turned out to be a house-
mate named Chadwick. The three officers, separated by a chain 
link fence, drew their weapons and twice told Hughes to drop the 
knife. Although Chadwick told the police to “take it easy” and later 
17 Hasan T. Arslan, Examining Police Interactions with the Mentally Ill in the United 
States, in Enhancing Police Service Delivery (James F. Albrecht & Garthden Heyer 
eds., 2021).
18 Rachel Treisman, “13-Year-Old Boy with Autism Shot by Salt Lake City Police,” 
NPR, Sept. 9, 2020, https://n.pr/3jazWm1.
19 Michael Gold & Troy Closson, “About Daniel Prude’s Case and Death: What We 
Know,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2021.
20 138 S. Ct. 1138 (2018).
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testified she did not feel endangered, and although Hughes ap-
peared “calm” throughout, within less than a minute Officer Kisela 
had shot Hughes.
Mario Woods also had a weapon. The police received a call from a 
man who said Woods had slashed his arm with a knife, after walk-
ing back and forth on the sidewalk, talking nonsense, and appearing 
to be “under the influence of something.”21 A video shows Woods, 
a few hours later, standing against a wall with a knife in his hands, 
surrounded by six to eight officers, most of them pointing guns. 
When he doesn’t put the knife down and starts limping away from 
the officers, he’s shot 20 times, many of the bullets hitting him in 
the back.22
The police might not be to blame in these situations. In Hughes’s 
case, the Supreme Court held that the police acted “in good faith” 
(although Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, stated in dissent that “it is ‘beyond debate’ that Kisela’s 
use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable”).23 Woods had 
hurt someone with his knife. But the question remains whether cops 
were the best first responders.
A typical reaction to these types of situations is to push for bet-
ter training of the police—training on how to handle people with 
mental illness, how to talk to people with delusions and hallucina-
tions, how to de-escalate. A number of jurisdictions have established 
crisis intervention teams (CITs) that rely either entirely on specially 
trained police officers or on teams of officers and mental health pro-
fessionals.24 But the research is, at best, equivocal on whether CITs 
work or are used properly. In Rochester, New York, where Prude was 
killed, a CIT program had existed for 15 years.25 A national study of 
21 Phil Matier & Andy Ross, “Mario Woods’ Last Moments: ‘You Better Squeeze 
That . . . and Kill Me,’” SFGate, Jan. 23, 2016, https://bit.ly/3gS98p6.
22 Julia Carrie Wong, “Mario Woods, Black Man Killed by Police, ‘Had 20 Gunshot 
Wounds,’” The Guardian, Feb. 12, 2016, https://bit.ly/3xVoxuB.
23 138 S. Ct. at 1161 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
24 Univ. of Memphis, CIT Ctr.: Overview, https://bit.ly/3gPyN1I (last accessed 
May 20, 2021) (reporting over 2,700 CIT programs nationwide as of 2017).
25 Noelle E.C. Evans, “One Year After Daniel Prude’s Death, Has Mental Health Care 
for People of Color Changed?,” NPR, Mar. 21, 2021, https://bit.ly/3hfbsFF.
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CITs found that, while the programs resulted in more people with 
mental illness being diverted out of the criminal justice system to 
psychiatric treatment, they did not significantly decrease the num-
ber of people killed or injured.26
An award-winning documentary called “Ernie and Joe: Crisis 
Cops” depicts two officers with the San Antonio Police Department 
“diverting people away from jail and into mental health treatment, 
one 911 call at a time.”27 There are several powerful moments in the 
film that show how well-trained, compassionate police officers can 
effectively de-escalate a situation without having, much less using, 
a weapon, and without any show of force. Perhaps the most potent 
message of the film, however, is that the officers are, in effect, mental 
health professionals. Not only do Ernie and Joe not have weapons, 
they often do not wear uniforms, and the techniques they use are 
similar to those that a good clinical social worker routinely uses in 
hospital wards. As Ernie says, they do not rely on the typical police 
academy use-of-force spectrum of “ask, tell, make”; instead, they lis-
ten, empathize, and hug.
Following that line of reasoning to its logical conclusion is a program 
called CAHOOTS (for Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets) in 
Eugene, Oregon.28 CAHOOTS teams are composed entirely of civil-
ians, usually a medic and a behavioral specialist who, when on call, 
endeavor to avoid “pseudo-professional” demeanors, and are often 
people who at one time needed services themselves. In 2019, these 
teams responded to 24,000 calls, about 20 percent of all dispatches 
in Eugene. They called for police backup in about 150 of those cases. 
But most of the time they responded on their own to a wide range of 
situations, including “substance addiction crises, psychotic episodes, 
homeless residents and threats of suicide, [and] depressed children.”29 
The efficacy of the program is hard to measure, but Eugene’s chief 
26 Michael Rogers, Dale E. McNiel, & Renee L. Binder, Effectiveness of Crisis Inter-
vention Programs, 47 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 1 (2019).
27 Ernie & Joe: Crisis Cops (HBO 2019).
28 See CAHOOTS, Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets, https://whitebirdclinic 
.org/cahoots.
29 Scottie Andrew, “This Town of 170,000 Replaced Some Cops with Medics and 
Mental Health Professionals. It’s Worked for Over 30 Years,” CNN, July 6, 2020, 
https://cnn.it/3jmQmrr.
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of police, who works closely with the CAHOOTS organization, says 
“When they show up, they have better success than police officers do. 
We’re wearing a uniform, a gun, a badge—it feels very demonstrative 
for someone in crisis.”30 No deaths or injuries have been attributed 
to the teams. Note also the important role of the 911 dispatcher in 
this system. If Caniglia had happened in Eugene, the dispatcher might 
have resisted the request for police assistance from Edward’s wife, 
and instead sent a CAHOOTS team.
The kink in the CAHOOTS program is a lack of dispositional op-
tions. The teams can usually avoid putting people in jail (which is 
where they often end up when the police are involved). But if a detox 
program or a homeless shelter is full, clients may have to be left on 
the streets, making many of them repeat players.
CAHOOTS deals primarily with issues of mental health and 
homelessness. “Civilian” responses are also possible for many other 
types of situations that police have traditionally been called on to 
handle, including potentially violent ones. In post–George Floyd 
Minneapolis, for instance, four teams of 20 to 30 members, including 
former felons and gang members, roam high-crime zones and try 
to intervene “before verbal taunts give way to fists or firearms.”31 
They themselves are not armed. Their effectiveness, according to 
one journalistic account, “relies on quick thinking, calm persua-
sion, and a credibility that derives, in part, from who they aren’t.”32 
Also in Minneapolis, armed police in schools are being replaced by 
“civilian safety specialists” who are not armed and are trained to 
handle conflict. In the wake of the nation’s many mass school shoot-
ings, the move is not uncontroversial, but is seen as a way of, among 
other things, easing racial tensions that uniformed officers can cre-
ate.33 Most dramatically, beginning in 2022, the police department 
in Ithaca, New York will be replaced by a “Community Solutions 
and Public Safety Department,” composed of a significant number 
30 Id.
31 Martin Kuz, “No Badges. No Guns: Can Violence Interrupters Help Minneapolis?,” 
Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 13, 2021.
32 Id.
33 Chelsea Sheasley, “In a Roiled Minneapolis, Schools Are Testing a New Model for 
Safety,” Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 20, 2021.
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of unarmed public servants, and a smaller number of armed officers 
who will respond to serious life-threatening situations.34
In terms of sheer numbers, perhaps the move that could have the 
largest impact on changing the role of the police and their relation-
ship with the community is in the domain of traffic enforcement. 
Across the country, police make 32 million car stops a year.35 The 
number could easily be much higher, given the dozens of laws that 
all of us violate daily, including not just speeding and failure-to-stop 
rules, but laws on seat belts, outdated license plates, defective equip-
ment, use of cellphones, crossing the median or shoulder, and failing 
to signal. Given the huge discretion traffic laws give the police, the 
potential for disparate application is also huge.
An unmeasurable but undoubtedly large number of traffic stops 
are pretextual—meaning that the real agenda behind the stop is not 
enforcement of the traffic laws but something much less benign, and 
perhaps racist.36 The Supreme Court has held that pretextual stops 
do not violate the Constitution, in part for the understandable rea-
son that discerning a cop’s motives is very difficult.37 Even so, many 
black and brown people are convinced that traffic laws are applied 
in a discriminatory manner, and they are backed up by research, 
which shows that people of color are proportionately more likely 
to be stopped than whites, yet proportionately less likely to have 
evidence of crime in their cars.38 Unfortunately, a not insignificant 
number of traffic stops also result in serious injuries, usually to the 
car’s occupants, sometimes to the police, and the occupants are often 
black.39 All of this provides still another reason for communities of 
34 City of Ithaca & Tompkins Cty., N.Y., Reimagining Public Safety Collaborative, 
https://bit.ly/3hZPGXU (click on City of Ithaca Resolution, Apr. 21, 2021).
35 Andrew Hurst, “Police Stop More than 32 Million Americans per Year for Traffic 
Violations,” ValuePenguin.com, June 24, 2021.
36 Charles R. Epp et al., Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship 
72–73, 155 (2014).
37 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
38 The latest study, of many, to so find is reported in Emma Pierson et al., A Large-
Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 Nat. 
Human Behav. 736 (2020).
39 For instance, in 2015 more than 100 people were shot by police during traffic stops, 
one in three of them black. Wesley Lowery, “A Disproportionate Number of Black 
Victims in Fatal Traffic Stops,” Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 2015.
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color to distrust the police, and still another plank in the Defund the 
Police campaign.
One response to this state of affairs is to separate traffic enforce-
ment from other policing tasks and make it a job for civilians, as 
Ithaca may soon do.40 Another is to rely on technology to catch traffic 
violators, who are then sent a summons, a process that avoids po-
tentially lethal police-citizen confrontations (but also riles powerful 
constituencies, as the short life of many red-light camera programs 
attests).41 A third solution is simply to discontinue stops for non-
moving violations such as defective equipment and failing to sig-
nal. When the police chief in Fayetteville, North Carolina, ordered a 
move in that direction in the years 2013 through 2016, “investigative 
stops” went to zero and stops of blacks plummeted 50 percent.42
Many of these moves toward reducing the police role are still ex-
perimental, and some could backfire. But they all have in common 
the idea that, in situations that do not call for the immediate use of 
force, alternatives to armed police might function just as well, if not 
better. Conversely, as Egon Bittner, the renowned sociologist, sug-
gested a half century ago, police might be most useful when there is 
an emergency calling for the use of physical or armed force. As he put 
it, “[t]he policeman, and the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, 
and required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to 
be used, to meet it.”43 That concept of the police role, in turn, gets us 
back to Caniglia and what it has to say about exigency and force.
II. Caretaking of Home Emergencies
Caniglia involved entry into the home, an entry the lower courts 
and the Supreme Court assumed was nonconsensual, and thus 
involved force.44 Under the Fourth Amendment, such force must 
40 For a discussion of this approach, see Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Po-
lice Authority and Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672, 754–59 (2015).
41 Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 
95 Cal. L. Rev. 199 (2007).
42 Ahmed Jallow, “What Would Happen If Cops Didn’t Make Certain Traffic Stops? 
This North Carolina City Offers a Case Study,” Burlington (N.C.) Times-News, 
Apr. 15, 2021, https://bit.ly/3qB8mzZ.
43 Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the 
Police, in The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice 17, 35 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974).
44 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1599; 953 F.3d at 122–23.
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usually be authorized by a warrant. “A basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law,” the Supreme Court has declared, “is that searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively un-
reasonable.”45 This rule protects the home—the ultimate sanctuary 
of individuals from state interference—from the unchecked discre-
tion of officers in the field. However, the Court has also long made 
clear that police may enter a home without a warrant when there 
are “exigent circumstances.”46 The Court has generally described 
exigent circumstances to include “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, . . . 
imminent destruction of evidence, . . . the need to prevent a suspect’s 
escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside 
or outside the dwelling.”47
Only the last exigency—sometimes called the “emergency aid 
exception”48—involves Justice Alito’s “tasks that go beyond criminal 
law enforcement” and thus might justify warrantless police entry on 
caretaker grounds. Consistent with this language, the sole exigency 
of this type that Justice Thomas mentioned in Caniglia was “emer-
gency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant 
from imminent injury.”49 Recall that most, if not all, of the other ex-
amples of permissible warrantless entries cited by the concurring 
justices also fit comfortably with this language. So the question nat-
urally arises whether any noncriminal goal besides emergency aid 
authorizes warrantless entry under the Fourth Amendment.
The majority opinion in Caniglia—which references the exigent 
circumstances exception and then states that “[t]he First Circuit’s 
‘community caretaking’ rule . . . goes beyond anything this Court 
has recognized”50—suggests the answer is no. Nonetheless, the four 
45 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
46 Id. at n.25 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1973)).
47 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
48 See, e.g., Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971) (“police officers may enter a 
dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom 
they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance”). Gauper was 
one of dozens of cases cited by the Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, in stating that 
“[n]umerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does 
not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reason-
ably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
49 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1599.
50 Id.
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justices who signed on to the three concurring opinions seem to be 
hesitant about a warrant-unless-exigency rule, either because they 
believe there needs to be an additional exception, beyond the emer-
gency-aid exception, or because they are worried that “emergency” 
will not be defined broadly enough. The tension on these issues came 
out during oral argument, through a series of hypotheticals thrown 
out by Chief Justice Roberts and the other justices. For instance, 
Roberts asked Caniglia’s attorney whether the Fourth Amendment 
would be violated by a warrantless entry after police received a call 
from neighbors of an elderly woman, who express concern that the 
woman had agreed to come over for dinner two hours earlier but had 
not shown up, could not be reached, and had not been seen leaving 
her home.51 The answer given by the attorney was that police could 
not enter the woman’s home without a warrant even after 24 hours 
had gone by, and that, even after several days, they could enter only 
after obtaining “a warrant for a missing person.” That reply clearly 
was not satisfactory to most of the justices.52
Justice Breyer (who ultimately joined Chief Justice Roberts’s con-
curring opinion) also asked a series of questions, beginning with 
this commentary:
There are so many situations where it’s obvious the police 
should enter. You know—a baby’s been crying for five hours, 
nobody seems to be around. A rat’s come out of a house at a 
time when rats carry serious disease and have to be stopped. A 
person goes into the house . . . but the people inside the house 
don’t know that that person has a serious communicable 
disease. . . . If we call those “exigent circumstances” we 
weaken the exigent circumstances [rule]. And if we move to 
a whole new thing like caretaker, I don’t know what we do.53
Caniglia’s attorney did not directly address all of Justice Breyer’s hy-
potheticals, but he did insist that there must be a “true emergency” 
to justify a warrantless entry.54
There are certainly definitions of the emergency-aid component of 
exigency that address “true emergencies” without going down the 
51 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021) (No. 20-157).
52 Id. at 8–9.
53 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 18.
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rabbit hole that Caniglia’s attorney did in answering Chief Justice 
Roberts’s elderly woman hypothetical. Any such formulation must 
address: (1) the seriousness of the harm or threat that can trigger the 
exception, (2) the certainty the harm has occurred or will occur, and, 
if it hasn’t occurred yet, (3) the imminence of the harm. In light of the 
observations in Part I, the test should also consider (4) the need for 
police to address the situation. An exigency standard that aims at limit-
ing warrantless caretaker entries to “true emergencies” might prohibit 
warrantless caretaker entries unless police have probable cause to be-
lieve that serious physical injury to a person either has occurred or is likely 
to occur, and that immediate assistance from the police is therefore needed.
This definition of exigency is relatively narrow. But it is consis-
tent with the Court’s exigency exceptions in noncaretaker situations 
(“hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,” “imminent destruction of evidence,” 
“the need to prevent a suspect’s escape”). It thus strongly reinforces 
“the basic Fourth Amendment principle” that warrantless entries 
into the home are presumptively unreasonable. At the same time, it 
signals, in tune with the first part of this article, that other govern-
ment actors besides the police might be more appropriate responders. 
Yet, despite these various restrictions, this narrower definition would 
probably produce the result Chief Justice Roberts seemed to want in 
his hypothetical, at least if the police were the only available option: 
if an officer was dispatched after the neighbors’ 911 call, checked on 
their story, knocked on the woman’s door, and got no answer, war-
rantless entry would be permitted under this formulation. Whether 
it would resolve Justice Breyer’s quandaries would depend on the rel-
evant facts. But to the extent his hypotheticals do not involve real exi-
gency, a visit from the welfare or public health agency, not the police 
department, would be a much more appropriate response.
In short, one could, and arguably should, read Caniglia to mean 
there is no caretaker exception independent of the emergency aid 
exception. Yet numerous courts have resisted that position.55 And, 
again, at least some of the justices may be hesitant about adopting it. 
55 See, e.g., Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that, while 
the two exceptions “overlap conceptually,” they are “not the same,” because “[t]he 
community caretaking doctrine requires a court to look at the function performed by a 
police officer, while the emergency exception requires an analysis of the circumstances 
to determine whether an emergency requiring immediate action existed”) (emphasis 
original).
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One source of this reluctance could stem from a concern that the 
traditional warrant regime is not a good fit in situations that do 
not involve crimefighting. For instance, in his concurring opinion 
in Caniglia, Justice Alito stated that “circumstances are exigent only 
when there is not enough time to get a warrant, and warrants are not 
typically granted for the purpose of checking on a person’s medical 
condition.”56 Similarly, the “missing person warrant” conjectured by 
Caniglia’s attorney would be a new phenomenon.
But the argument that warrants should not be required in such 
situations because they have not been in the past is, at best, unimagi-
native. As the Court has recognized in the investigative context, the 
advent of telephonic warrants means that judicial authorization can 
be obtained relatively expeditiously,57 meaning that the process of 
obtaining a court order today is nowhere near as cumbersome as 
in the days when Cady was decided. And the judicial process can 
easily be adapted to the nonemergency caretaker scenario. Justice 
Alito himself speculates, after noting the atypicality of caretaker 
warrants, “[p]erhaps States should institute procedures for the issu-
ance of such warrants.”58 In fact, that is precisely what many states 
have done in addressing situations like the one in Caniglia. Today 
at least 19 states—including Rhode Island, where Edward Caniglia 
lived—have enacted “red flag laws” that provide for “Extreme Risk 
Protection Orders” or “Gun Violence Restraining Orders” authoriz-
ing confiscation of weapons from people with mental illness who are 
considered dangerous.59 Some of these laws can be triggered only 
by a mental health professional; in others, family members, school 
administrators, and the police can do so. In some states, such orders 
can also be issued in response to other people considered possible 
threats, such as domestic abusers and those who abuse substances.60 
While these orders are normally not called “warrants,” they fulfill 
56 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., concurring).
57 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154–55 (2013) (making this observation in a 
case in which a warrantless draw of the defendant’s blood occurred 25 minutes after 
his arrest).
58 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., concurring).
59 Sean Cambpell, Alex Yablon, & Jennifer Mascia, “Red Flag Laws: Where the Bills 
Stand in Each State,” The Trace, Dec. 22, 2020, https://bit.ly/3h25fxP.
60 Id.
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the same role by identifying the place to be searched and the item to 
be seized (or, in the case of missing or injured persons, the person to 
be searched for).
A closely related argument on behalf of a relaxed exigency ex-
ception in caretaker situations is that a more restrictive approach 
is not flexible enough to allow police to respond to all of the im-
portant circumstances in which they are needed. Requiring prob-
able cause to believe a person is hurt or in danger, it might be said, 
is too onerous a standard given the potential harm involved. This 
may be Justice Kavanaugh’s main concern. In his concurring opin-
ion in Caniglia, Kavanaugh approvingly cited a lower court judge’s 
law review article noting that “municipal police spend a good deal 
of time responding to calls about missing persons, sick neighbors, 
and premises left open at night” and asserting that “the responsibil-
ity of police officers” to carry out these tasks “has never been the 
subject of serious debate.”61 Justice Kavanaugh then posits two hy-
potheticals, one involving a woman who calls 911 saying she is con-
templating suicide and who does not respond when police knock, 
and the second an elderly man who uncharacteristically misses 
church services, repeatedly fails to answer his phone through the 
day and night, and does not answer to police performing a wellness 
check. In both cases, Kavanaugh declared that “of course” police 
may enter the home without a warrant.62
The point of these hypotheticals may have been to demonstrate 
that there are many instances when the injury or potential for injury 
is not certain, but police should be able to act anyway. Of course, 
the “probable cause” standard, which can be satisfied on something 
less than a “preponderance of the evidence,”63 takes that fact into 
account. But there are signs the Court believes that this standard 
is insufficiently malleable. In fact, in another caretaker-type case, 
Brigham City v. Stuart,64 the Court said as much. Brigham City involved 
61 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1604 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Debra Livingston, 
Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 261, 
263 (1998)).
62 Id. at 1604–05.
63 See Am. L. Inst., Model Code of Pre-Arraignment, §§ 120.1(2), 210.1 (the comments 
to both sections make this point).
64 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
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police entry of a home after they had been called to the scene by a 
noise complaint and witnessed a struggle through a screen door. In 
upholding the warrantless entry, the Court eschewed probable cause 
language in favor of a test requiring “an objectively reasonable basis 
for believing” that aid is needed.65 Some lower courts have been ex-
plicit about lowering the certainty required for police to act on care-
taking rationale.66
Although this stance has occasioned some academic criticism, it 
is consistent with the idea that when the government’s objective is 
prevention, rather than investigating an already completed act, the 
requisite justification may be relaxed. This, for instance, is one expla-
nation for the Court’s well-known decision in Terry v. Ohio,67 autho-
rizing a “protective frisk” on reasonable suspicion, a lower standard 
than probable cause. It is also one basis for the Court’s decision in 
Addington v. Texas,68 which refused to require that, in civil commit-
ment proceedings, dangerousness to self or others be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and instead permitted involuntary hospitaliza-
tion on the less demanding clear and convincing standard of proof. 
My proposed exigency rule, which refers to probable cause to believe 
that harm is likely to occur, rather than probable cause to believe it 
will occur, in fact recognizes this point. Perhaps, with that under-
standing, Justice Kavanaugh would be satisfied with the rule.69
65 Id. at 399.
66 One often-cited case is People v. Mitchell, which held that, for the exception to apply, 
“(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at 
hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. 
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate 
the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177–78 (1976).
67 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
68 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
69 Justice Kavanaugh elaborated on his view of Sanders v. United States. 956 F.3d 
534 (8th Cir. 2020). There, the dispatcher received a call from the grandmother 
of an 11-year-old child, who had called her saying that her mother and her boy-
friend were “fighting real bad”; the grandmother added that there were three chil-
dren inside the house and that she couldn’t tell from the child’s report whether 
a weapon was involved. Upon arrival, police saw the child through a window 
“acting excited” and gesturing. When they knocked on the door, the mother came 
outside, had red marks on her face, was emotionally unstable, and told police not 
to tell her boyfriend that the 11-year-old had called. When the police asked to talk 
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A final reason for favoring a relaxed exigency requirement may 
simply be the assumption that the motives of the police in these 
types of cases are benign, and thus that the usual restrictions 
are not needed. Of course, if the police are really there to help, 
consent will often be forthcoming. And when it is not, benign 
motives do not necessarily eliminate the violation experienced 
by those whose homes are mistakenly or precipitously invaded 
by the police (as evidenced by the many lawsuits that are brought 
in such situations70). Most important, as many courts have rec-
ognized, police motives can be mixed.71 For instance, some cases 
have held that the caretaker exception applies when police serv-
ing a court order knock on a door and receive no response, under 
circumstances suggesting there should be one.72 That rule creates 
an incentive for the police to use service of process as a pretext to 
carry out a house search they cannot get a magistrate to author-
ize, simply by waiting until a person is not home and then using 
the lack of response to enter, out of “concern” the person may 
to the boyfriend, the mother said she would get him to come outside, but when 
she opened the door, the police heard a baby crying. The police entered at that 
point, despite the mother saying everything was okay and making clear she did 
not want the police to enter, and despite the boyfriend, who was just inside the 
door, also telling them not to enter. The Eighth Circuit upheld the entry under 
the caretaker exception, but the Supreme Court remanded in light of Caniglia’s 
rejection of that exception. Justice Kavanaugh wrote an opinion agreeing with the 
remand but stating that the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion was not necessarily wrong, 
given the Court’s decision in Brigham City. Sanders v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 
1646, 1647 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Since the police had probable cause 
to believe an assault had occurred and that children inside the house were fearful, 
the emergency aid component of exigency, as defined here, was present. Consider, 
however, whether a CAHOOTS-type intervention would have been preferable.
70 See, e.g., Smith v. Kan. City, Mo. Police Dep’t, 586 F.3d 576, 580–81 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(officer not entitled to qualified immunity when he entered a third party’s home 
looking for a domestic violence suspect without a warrant); Briones v. City of San 
Bernardino, 2012 WL 13124164 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (officer denied summary judgment 
on claim that entering a locked gate, opening closed door and shooting dog was justi-
fied under caretaker exception because of belief that a “hung up” 911 call was from 
plaintiff’s home).
71 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 66.
72 United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Peddle, 7 
Fed. Appx. 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2001).
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be injured.73 Many other caretaking pretexts, real or imagined, 
are available—from hearing loud noises to Justice Breyer’s rats.74 
Most disturbingly, the government has frequently argued that 
warrantless entry should be permitted on a caretaker rationale 
even when it is clear the real goal of the police was obtaining evi-
dence of crime; unfortunately, occasionally courts have agreed.75
There are at least four responses to the pretext problem. The first 
is to allow individuals to argue that the police used the community 
caretaker exception as a pretext. But motive is very difficult to prove, 
and, in any event, the Court held in the aforementioned Brigham City 
case (where there was some dispute as to the real agenda of the cops 
who entered), that “as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, 
justify the action,” police motives are irrelevant.76 A second solution 
is to require exclusion of any evidence found during a community 
caretaker entry, regardless of motive.77 While this rule may deter 
some pretextual actions, in many such cases the police have nothing 
to lose by going ahead since, by definition, they know they cannot 
make their case through a legally authorized investigation. Further, 
if they do find evidence of a crime, it can always be confiscated even 
if it isn’t admissible, and it could also facilitate subsequent legitimate 
investigation. In any event, the Supreme Court, already antagonistic 
73 Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (excluding evidence found inside Vale’s 
home after police, with warrants to detain him for a court appearance, delayed ex-
ecution of the warrants until Vale came outside the house and engaged in suspicious 
behavior that gave them grounds for conducting a search of his home incident to 
arrest).
74 Cf. United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996) (officers responding to 
loud noise report entered back door and went into basement after getting no response 
at front door).
75 United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding exception did 
not apply when officers were searching for stolen property); United States v. Erickson, 
991 F.2d 529, 530–31 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding exception did not apply when officers 
were investigating a burglary); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 540 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(same); State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d, 594–95 (Wis. 2010) (finding exception did ap-
ply when police entered to investigate an anonymous tip that cocaine was inside and 
found door open).
76 547 U.S. at 404.
77 Mark Goreczny, Taking Care While Doing Right by the Fourth Amendment: A 
Pragmatic Approach to the Community Caretaker Exception, 14 Cardozo Pub. L. 
Pol’y & Ethics J. 229, 251 (2015).
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to the exclusionary rule,78 is not likely to extend it unless its applica-
tion is likely to bring significant deterrence.
The solution to the pretext problem that is closest to the major-
ity’s holding in Caniglia is to require police to obtain a court order 
in the absence of real exigency, just as they must do when they want 
to enter a home for investigative purposes. While police control the 
storyline whether they appear before a magistrate ex post (in a sup-
pression hearing) or ex ante (when seeking a warrant), at least in the 
latter situation they do not have the advantage of hindsight bias when 
they try to explain their community caretaking reason for entering 
the home.79 Pretextual searches of homes are harder to pull off if the 
pretext has to be justified before entry occurs.
The fourth solution, of course, is to avoid police involvement en-
tirely, for all the reasons explored in Part I. If the bulk of caretaker 
situations are handled by civilians, there will be fewer entries (be-
cause pretexts will not be manufactured as a ruse to obtain crimi-
nal evidence) and fewer pretextual entries (because civilians are not 
interested in criminal evidence). This solution also suggests how 
the courts might approach the many searches and seizures that the 
courts have said involve “special needs.”
III. Caretaking Outside the Home
In Cady v. Dombrowski,80 the police, looking in a car for the re-
volver of another officer after he had crashed the car, came upon 
evidence eventually connected with a murder. Dombrowski, the of-
ficer, argued that, since at the time of the search the car had been 
impounded and he had been in jail on drunk driving charges, there 
was no exigency and the officers should have obtained a warrant. 
The police claimed that their only goal in searching the car was to 
find Dombrowki’s gun, which was supposed to be in an officer’s 
78 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (in expanding the good faith ex-
ception to the rule, stating that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 
be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently cul-
pable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”).
79 This was one of William Stuntz’s arguments in favor of a warrant requirement. 
See William Stuntz, The Role of Warrants in an Exclusionary Rule System, 77 Va. L. 
Rev. 881, 910–18 (1991).
80 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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possession at all times and had not been found on his person. They 
did not see the revolver in the car. But they did find, in the trunk 
of the car, clothes and various other items covered with blood. The 
Supreme Court upheld the search, despite the lack of a warrant.
In so doing, Cady used the language that became the focus of at-
tention in Caniglia. The Cady Court noted that police “frequently 
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal 
liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be de-
scribed as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from 
the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
a violation of a criminal statute.”81 In Caniglia Justice Thomas em-
phasized that this language in Cady was closely linked to searches 
of cars, with Cady stressing throughout that “for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between 
houses and cars.”82 On its face, then, Caniglia, which involved the 
search of a house, had nothing to say about the caretaker exception 
and car searches.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that Caniglia’s concern 
about a “freestanding” caretaker exception disappears when the 
caretaker search is of a car rather than a home. As demonstrated in 
Part I, pretextual searches of cars are exceedingly common, prob-
ably much more so than pretextual searches of houses. Of course, 
in the typical car search case, the Court has already made clear 
that, because of their mobility and the lesser expectation of pri-
vacy associated with them, automobiles can usually be searched 
without a warrant.83 But a warrant might still be required when a 
car is within the police’s control and there is clearly time to get a 
warrant; the question then arises whether a caretaker exception 
should apply.
One could be excused for concluding that Cady held precisely that. 
At one point, the Court stated that the search of the car was needed 
“to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall 
into untrained or perhaps malicious hands” because the car was in a 
lot over which no guard had been posted.84 In support of a caretaker 
81 Id. at 441.
82 Id. at 439.
83 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424–25 (1981).
84 Cady, 413 U.S. at 443.
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exception, one could point to this language and argue that, so long 
as police have some reason to believe the contents of a car pose a 
danger to the public, warrantless entry is permissible, even if no im-
mediate exigency exists.
However, read more closely and with the aid of hindsight, Cady 
is not about a freestanding caretaker exception at all. Rather, it was 
based on a nascent version of what would come to be called the in-
ventory exception to the warrant requirement, which is meant to 
allow police departments to conduct warrantless searches of im-
pounded cars for dangerous items and valuables that might other-
wise be stolen, and to protect the police against false claims of theft. 
As developed in cases like Opperman v. South Dakota,85 decided three 
years after Cady, warrantless searches of cars are authorized if (1) the 
car has been lawfully impounded, (2) the search is conducted pur-
suant to a written policy, and (3) the search is not pretextual.86 Cady 
was not as specific as one might desire on all three of these points, 
but it did point out both that Dombrowski’s car had been properly 
impounded after the accident and that the police followed “standard 
procedure” in looking for weapons in the car.87 Further, relevant to 
the pretext point, the Court emphasized that “at the time the search 
was conducted Officer Weiss was ignorant of the fact that a murder, 
or any other crime, had been committed.”88
All of this is important not only because it constrains use of care-
taker language in cases involving cars, but also because it could 
have significant implications for police involvement in a large set 
of search-and-seizure scenarios that have come to be called “special 
needs” cases. The first Supreme Court opinion using this phrase, 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,89 involved the search of a school child’s purse 
for cigarettes, in the absence of a warrant and on only minimal sus-
picion. The Court upheld the search because, in the words of Justice 
Harry Blackmun’s concurring opinion, school searches involve “ex-
ceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
85 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
86 Id. at 374–76 (citing Cady in support).
87 Cady, 413 U.S. at 443.
88 Id. at 447.
89 469 U.S. 325 (1984).
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requirements impracticable.”90 This language later found its way 
into an entirely different type of case—involving health and safety 
inspection regimes; license, sobriety, and immigration checkpoints; 
school and work drug-testing programs; and other “programmatic” 
searches and seizures—where the Court has permitted searches and 
seizures of groups conducted in the absence of suspicion with respect 
to any particular person or entity, so long as there is an “adequate 
substitute” for a warrant.91
A key reason the Court has been willing to relax traditional Fourth 
Amendment strictures in these cases is that, at least in the Court’s 
eyes, the searches and seizures they involve are not focused on “a 
general interest in crime control” but rather on enforcement of disci-
plinary infractions and regulatory violations.92 Concomitantly, these 
searches and seizures typically are carried out not by police but by 
“civilians”—public school teachers, public employers, and bureau-
crats working for agencies like the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration. Indeed, one reason the Court has been willing to 
relax the warrant and probable-cause requirements in these cases is 
that it does not want to burden civilian officials with a warrant pro-
cess and worries about the “niceties” of probable cause.93
The Court’s special-needs jurisprudence has been roundly criticized 
for blinking at the fact that criminal prosecution often lurks in the back-
ground of these cases, and for too readily giving up on the probable-
cause requirement. But the point here is more circumscribed. Whatever 
may be the right interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when civilian 
officials are carrying out these searches and seizures, when the police 
are conducting them, the Fourth Amendment should apply with full 
force. When civilians are the government’s emissaries, concerns about 
misuse of force and pretextual actions may be minimal. But when the 
90 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91 Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 254, 
275–76 (2011) (pointing out these two variants).
92 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420 (2015) (“Search regimes where no 
warrant is ever required may be reasonable where ‘special needs . . . make the warrant 
and probable-cause requirement impracticable,’ and where the ‘primary purpose’ of 
the searches is ‘[d]istinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’”) (citing 
inspection, parolee, and checkpoint cases).
93 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–43 (involving searches by school teachers); O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (involving searches by employers).
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police are the government’s agents, those concerns are at their height, 
and traditional Fourth Amendment constraints should apply.
With respect to the first special-needs variant—focused on a par-
ticular individual—those constraints are clear. The usual warrant, 
probable-cause, and exigency rules should govern. That would 
mean, for instance, that if a “school resource officer” is an off-duty 
police officer or a cop in disguise, armed with a gun and trained in 
investigative techniques, even a search aimed at enforcing a school 
disciplinary rule would require a warrant in the absence of exigency.
If, instead, a special-needs search or seizure is programmatic—as 
with checkpoints, inspections, and drug testing—the group nature 
of the police action means an individualized suspicion require-
ment cannot work. But a stricter version of the inventory model 
broached in Cady (also alluded to in a smattering of other Supreme 
Court cases94) could. As I have argued elsewhere,95 the most ef-
fective way of preventing arbitrary police action in programmatic 
search-and-seizure situations is to require statutory authorization 
of the program, even-handed implementation across the entire tar-
get group, and a ban on pretextual action. The latter prohibition 
could be enforced by exclusion of any evidence found that is not 
within the statutory remit (a sanction that is likely to have greater 
deterrent impact here than in individual home entry cases because 
it applies program-wide). Or, as the Court itself recently required in 
some inspection settings, the pretext concern could be addressed 
by allowing targets to argue to a neutral decisionmaker, pre-search, 
that the inspection is not consistent with the statutory mandate or 
an even-handed application of it.96
94 The best case in this regard is Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), which in-
volved inspections of coal mines. The Court upheld the inspection scheme because that 
statute (and accompanying regulations) “requires inspection of all mines and specifi-
cally defines the frequency of inspection,” and establishes “the standards with which a 
mine operator is required to comply . . . rather than leaving the frequency and purpose 
of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers. . . .” Id. at 603–04 
(emphasis original). However, the Court has been less than punctilious in following the 
rules developed in cases like Cady, Opperman, and Dewey. See Christopher Slobogin, 
Advanced Introduction to U.S. Criminal Procedure § 4.8 (2020).
95 Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91 (2016).
96 Patel, 576 U.S. at 420. See also Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 539–40 
(1967) (requiring an “area warrant” before nonconsensual entry by inspectors).
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Thus, for instance, field officers would not be permitted to set up “li-
cense checkpoints” on a whim, in whatever neighborhood they want, 
with drug-sniffing dogs waiting in the wings.97 Instead, the legisla-
ture would have to authorize such checkpoints and set out general 
guidelines for their use. Further, the police agencies implementing the 
statute would have to create a neutral plan (for instance, one calling 
for checkpoints at every major thoroughfare—including those in pre-
dominantly white neighborhoods—a certain number of times a year), 
make sure it is neutrally applied (by requiring, for instance, that every 
driver is stopped), and avoid engaging in any action that goes beyond 
the scope of a license check (including have dogs standing by). While 
there are good reasons for requiring this type of regulatory regime 
in every programmatic special-needs situation, it is crucial when the 
police, or facsimiles thereof, are the instigators, as is the case not only 
with license checkpoints, but sobriety and immigration checkpoints 
as well. The same holds true for inspections when police are involved. 
For instance, in City of Los Angeles v. Patel,98 the police, acting under 
authority of a city ordinance, arbitrarily checked hotel registries for 
evidence of drug dealing or prostitution. In such cases, objectors 
should be entitled to pre-compliance review, regardless of the rules 
that might apply when the inspectors are civilians. Otherwise, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Patel, the statutory authorization “creates an 
intolerable risk that searches . . . will exceed statutory limits, or be 
used as a pretext to harass. . . .”99
Finally, to repeat the central point of this article, if the special 
needs situation does not require armed officers trained to detect and 
deter crime, police should not be involved at all. In Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston,100 decided in 2001, the Supreme Court came close to say-
ing as much. There the Court invalidated a police-initiated drug test-
ing program for pregnant women, despite claims that the program 
was designed primarily to obtain treatment for the women. Unfor-
tunately, however, earlier Court decisions involving programmatic 
searches and seizures had no difficulty allowing police to conduct 
97 A common practice, apparently. See, e.g., Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 1668 (Tex. 
Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (upholding such a checkpoint); McCray v. State, 601 S.E.2d 452 
(Ga. 2004) (same).
98 576 U.S. 409.
99 Id. at 421.
100 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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them even in the absence of serious restrictions, at least if no other 
agency was available to take up the task.101
Perhaps Caniglia, along with Patel and Ferguson, signal a change 
in attitude. While Caniglia does not purport to pronounce anything 
about special-needs doctrine, it does bolster Ferguson’s rejection of 
the notion that Fourth Amendment protections can be diluted sim-
ply on the ground that the police are engaged in something other 
than investigation of crime. In describing the First Circuit’s holding 
in Caniglia, Justice Thomas was clearly displeased with that court’s 
justification for its broad caretaker exception and its application to 
Edward Caniglia’s case:
[T]he First Circuit saw no need to consider whether anyone 
had consented to respondents’ actions; whether these actions 
were justified by “exigent circumstances”; or whether any 
state law permitted this kind of mental-health intervention. 
All that mattered was that respondents’ efforts to protect 
petitioner and those around him were “distinct from ‘the 
normal work of criminal investigation,’” fell “within the rule 
of reason,” and generally tracked what the court viewed to be 
“sound police procedure.”102
Relying on Caniglia’s disdain for the First Circuit’s formulation, the 
argument is strong that, when a nonexigent search or seizure is car-
ried out by police, the assertion that it is not aimed at “ordinary 
crime control” should be irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis, 
regardless of whether it occurs inside or outside the home.
101 See in particular, New York v. Burger, involving searches of junkyards for stolen 
car parts under a state statute that allowed police to conduct warrantless searches 
during business hours, any time and as many times as they wanted to do so. There 
the Court stated:
[W]e fail to see any constitutional significance in the fact that police 
officers, rather than “administrative” agents, are permitted to conduct 
the . . . inspection. . . . [S]tate police officers . . . have numerous duties 
in addition to those associated with traditional police work. . . . As a 
practical matter, many States do not have the resources to assign the 
enforcement of a particular administrative scheme to a specialized 
agency. So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it 
is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the 
power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by 
the scheme itself. 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987).
102 Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1599.
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Conclusion
Among government officials, police have a near monopoly on the 
use of physical force and the greatest incentive to hide their motives. 
An expansive interpretation of Caniglia v. Strom’s rejection of a free-
standing caretaker exception would help curb both police misuse 
of force and police use of pretexts to pursue illegitimate agendas, 
because it would limit police-initiated searches and seizures pur-
porting to be for benign purposes. It might also provide doctrinal 
support for the fledgling movement to de-police those government 
services that, whatever might be the tradition, do not require the 
intervention of armed individuals trained to fight crime, at the same 
time it would put guardrails around the special-needs doctrine. It 
may be that, outside of real emergencies, the last thing we want po-
lice to do is function as “caretakers” of the community.
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